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Non­technical Summary 
Each year over 4,000 Research and Development (R&D) projects in more than 2,500 firms 
receive public grants from the German Federal Government under the non-defense Direct 
R&D Project Funding (DPF) scheme. This scheme is the most important tool used by the 
German government to fund R&D in private businesses. However, the number of subsidized 
firms does not reveal whether it is always the same group of companies that receive funding, 
or whether the beneficiaries change over time. Understanding the temporal structure of 
subsidy distribution could help future research explain the effects and effectiveness of 
subsidies. In the face of shrinking government budgets and intensified international 
competition in the field of technology, knowing and increasing the efficiency of innovation 
policies has become crucial.  
In this study the focus is set on the DPF. The aim of this paper is to analyze the structure of 
the firms receiving R&D subsidies over time. In particular, I tackle the question of whether 
the same firms enjoy subsidies over time. There is still very little empirical evidence on the 
dynamics of firms’ participation in public funding schemes. In order to investigate the 
persistence of funding it is necessary to distinguish between two types of persistence. One is 
simply due to the fact that funded projects may run for more than one calendar year. The other 
is due to newly approved projects. In the DPF scheme, approved projects last on average for 
about three years.  
The empirical part of this paper is based on an annual innovation survey, the German part of 
the Community Innovation Survey (CIS). This is merged with the DPF database in order to 
identify a firm’s subsidy status in each year. The sample consists of over 6,000 different firms 
covering the manufacturing and knowledge-intensive service sectors over the time period 
from 1994 to 2005. Transition rates are calculated which describe the participation in the DPF 
scheme between two periods in a univariate context. The share of innovating firms which 
enter the funding scheme is extremely low. But if a firm has made it into the DPF scheme, the 
probability of getting subsidies for new projects in the following year is higher than that of 
dropping out of the scheme. Overall, participation in the funding scheme is found to be quite 
stable.  
The multivariate analysis also shows that for the probability of getting new projects approved 
for the funding scheme, experience in the same scheme matters, beyond the subsidy status in 
the preceding year. In order to enter the DPF scheme, experience with other subsidy programs 
is also helpful. At the same time, it is important to control for the overall supply of subsidies. 
In addition, large firms are more successful in receiving funding for new projects. Thus the 
evidence cannot confirm that the scheme is achieving the government’s aim of supporting 
SMEs in particular. The hypotheses that firms with higher knowledge capabilities are more 
likely to enter and stay in the scheme can be supported as I found positive impacts of R&D 
activities and human capital.  
  
Das Wichtigste in Kürze (Summary in German) 
In den meisten OECD-Ländern fördert der Staat Forschungsaktivitäten der Unternehmen, um 
damit die Innovationskraft und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit zu stärken. In Deutschland ist das 
wichtigste Instrument des Bundes für die finanzielle Förderung von FuE-Tätigkeiten in der 
Wirtschaft die direkte Projektförderung (DPF). Diese Maßnahme fördert im Rahmen von 
Fachprogrammen FuE-Projekte mittels nicht zurückzahlbarer Zuschüsse, die in bestimmten 
Schlüsseltechnologien angesiedelt sind. Im Rahmen der DPF werden jedes Jahr über 4.000 
FuE-Projekte in über 2.500 Unternehmen gefördert. 2005 erhielten die Unternehmen auf 
diesem Wege über 700 Millionen Euro.  
Informationen über die Anzahl der geförderten Unternehmen geben jedoch noch keinen 
Aufschluss über die Struktur der Zuwendungsempfänger im Zeitverlauf, d.h. ob die 
Zusammensetzung der geförderten Unternehmen eine hohe Dynamik aufweist. Aber gerade 
die zeitliche Struktur spielt unter Umständen eine wichtige Rolle bei der Beurteilung der 
Auswirkungen der Förderung.  
Daher ist das Ziel dieser Studie, die Teilnahme der Unternehmen an der DPF hinsichtlich der 
zeitlichen Struktur empirisch zu analysieren. Die Untersuchung basiert auf dem Mannheimer 
Innovationspanel, einer jährlich durchgeführten Innovationserhebung. Dieser Datensatz 
wurde mit Informationen der DPF-Datenbank ergänzt, um den Förderstatus der Unternehmen 
in jedem Jahr zu identifizieren. Der Datensatz für die Untersuchung besteht aus über 6.000 
verschiedenen Unternehmen aus dem Verarbeitendem Gewerbe und Dienstleistungssektor.  
Im ersten Schritt werden Übergangswahrscheinlichkeiten berechnet, die die Teilnahme der 
Unternehmen an der DPF in zwei aufeinander folgenden Jahren beschreiben. Dabei erweist 
sich der Anteil der Unternehmen, die neu an der DPF teilnehmen, als extrem klein. Wenn 
jedoch ein Unternehmen bereits an der DPF partizipiert, ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit höher, 
weitere neu geförderte Projekte zu bekommen, als aus der Förderung auszuscheiden. 
Insgesamt kann die Teilnahme an der Maßnahme als recht stabil beurteilt werden. Die darauf 
aufbauende multivariate Untersuchung zeigt ferner, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit ein neues 
Projekt genehmigt zu bekommen, nicht nur vom Förderstatus im vorhergehenden Jahr 
abhängig ist, sondern mit der Erfahrung insgesamt im Programm steigt. Um an der DPF zu 
partizipieren, spielt auch die Erfahrung mit anderen Fördermaßnahmen eine positive Rolle. 
Außerdem sind große Unternehmen erfolgreicher neu an der DPF teilzunehmen und auch 
weitere Projekte gefördert zu bekommen. Die Hypothese, dass Unternehmen mit besseren 
Fähigkeiten in Bezug auf Wissenserzeugung und -management mit einer höheren 
Wahrscheinlichkeit öffentliche Zuschüsse für neue FuE-Projekte erhalten, kann bestätigt 
werden, da FuE-Aktivitäten und Humankapital jeweils einen positiven Einfluss ausüben.  
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Abstract 
This paper looks at which firms receive R&D project grants and how this 
public support evolves over time by considering in particular firm’s 
previous participation. The question of the allocation of public R&D 
funding is becoming particularly important when it comes to identifying 
the effects of subsidies. Using firm-level data on German manufacturing 
and knowledge-intensive service firms, it turns out that participation in 
the funding scheme shows a rather high level of continuity. This is also 
confirmed by applying a multivariate approach. Firms who received 
funding in the past are more likely to be selected for public funding 
again. Moreover, a firm’s size and knowledge capabilities increase the 
probability of entering the scheme. It is also revealed that in an analysis 
of the allocation of grants it is important to control for the overall supply 
of corresponding subsidies. 
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1 Introduction 
Each year over 4,000 Research and Development (R&D) projects in more than 2,500 firms 
receive public grants from the German Federal Government under the Direct R&D Project 
Funding (DPF) scheme.1 However, the number of subsidized firms does not reveal whether it 
is always the same group of companies that receive funding, or whether the beneficiaries 
change over time. Thus the first question which arises is how public subsidies are allocated 
across firms over time. 
The question of the allocation of public R&D funding across firms is particularly important 
when it comes to identifying the microeconomic effects of subsidies with respect to input or 
output additionality. In order to answer the question appropriately a potential bias needs to be 
controlled for. Many studies begin by determining a firm’s probability of receiving a subsidy. 
For this purpose it is necessary to know in detail how specific schemes allocate subsidies in 
practice. Understanding the temporal structure of subsidy distribution could help future 
research explain the effects and effectiveness of subsidies. Especially in the face of shrinking 
government budgets and intensified international competition in the field of technology, 
knowing and increasing the efficiency of innovation policies has become crucial. 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the structure of the firms receiving public R&D funding 
over time. In particular, I tackle the question of whether the same firms enjoy subsidies over 
time which would mean that there is, to some extent, a pool of firms which are funded 
continuously. The other alternative is that the composition of subsidized firms is highly 
dynamic thanks to a steady entry into and exit from the subsidy scheme at the firm level. Thus 
the funded firms change continuously.  
There is still very little empirical evidence on the dynamics of firms’ participation in public 
funding schemes. In the empirical literature there are several studies which include an 
analysis of firms’ subsidy participation. However there are only a few papers which consider 
the subsidies over time by controlling for the experience of applying for or receiving public 
awards. Based on these studies it seems that firm’s subsidy histories have an impact on 
obtaining awards in the future. 
A lot of subsidy programs are available on the regional, national and European level which 
might have different allocation rules due to different goals and eligibility criteria. Thus, it is 
important to make a distinction in the analysis of these programs. This means one analysis 
should concentrate on one specific program in order to get precise results. The focus on 
specific funding schemes is lacking in most empirical studies. Another issue is the length of 
the period over which a single award is distributed to a firm. Since subsidies are often granted 
for projects that run over several years, the persistence of subsidies will be over-estimated if 
                                                 
1 Excluding DPF grants awarded as contract research. The database on which the calculations are based is 
described in section 4. 
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this fact is not taken into account. I contribute to the literature by considering these two issues 
in this study.  
In this study I concentrate on the German Federal Government’s non-defense DPF scheme. 
This is the most important tool used by the German government to fund R&D in private 
businesses. In 2005, firms received a total of 745 million euros under this scheme (BMBF, 
2006a).2 The importance of this funding scheme will increase in Germany in the coming years 
since it is the main distribution channel for the new High-Tech strategy launched by the 
Federal Government (BMBF, 2006b). I focus on the question of which firms receive the new 
grants awarded under this scheme. In the DPF scheme a subsidy is granted for three years on 
average. The duration of each project is known and is considered in the analysis.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section 2 outlines the arguments, aims and 
mechanisms of direct R&D project subsidies delivered by the Federal Government of 
Germany. Section 3 reviews the empirical literature concerning firms’ participation in R&D 
subsidy programs. The subsequent section 4 depicts some stylized facts on the population of 
awarded DPF grants with respect to the participation history of the firms which receive these 
grants. The data set underlying the empirical analysis is a representative sample of German 
firms covering the manufacturing and knowledge-intensive service sector and consists of over 
6,000 firms. The sample and results of a descriptive analysis of subsidized and not subsidized 
firms are shown in section 5. The funding scheme is then examined in a multivariate context 
with the help of markov chains. The econometric model and the estimation results are 
presented in section 6, before drawing conclusions in the last section. 
2 The Direct Project Funding (DPF) Scheme 
Rationale and Mechanisms 
The German Federal government supports the view that in a market economy competition 
makes sure that new products and processes are generated and that demand potentials and 
profit opportunities are ascertained by the companies. Even though, theoretically, companies 
are responsible for their own R&D and innovation decisions, the government states that 
public support can be beneficial and refers to the external effects of R&D (BT-Drs., 1988). 
The externalities of R&D lead to the problem that leaking knowledge increases social returns 
but reduces private returns. If R&D generates higher social returns than private returns, the 
level of R&D activities in the economy in question is below the socially desirable level (see 
Arrow, 1962; Levin et al., 1987; Adams and Jaffe, 1996). Public support should increase 
private R&D investment to the socially optimal level. In addition the government argues that 
public support of R&D related to public goods like, for example, the quality of air or water is 
justified due to the lack of corresponding markets. Other reasons for state aid for private R&D 
                                                 
2 € 448.5 million were given by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research, € 296.1 million by the Federal 
Ministry of Economics and Technology. 
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can be an extremely long time horizon of R&D projects, high economic or technical risk or 
extremely high costs which one firm alone cannot bear (BT-Drs., 1984; BT-Drs., 1988; BT-
Drs., 1993). 
The German government employs a variety of instruments in its R&D policy, for example, 
institutional funding and indirect and direct support schemes. In cases when a selective 
solution is aimed at and other support instruments are insufficiently target-oriented, too 
intricate, or a cross-industry key technology is targeted, direct R&D project funding is used 
(BT-Drs., 1984). The overall objective of this support scheme is to achieve a high level 
economic performance and competitiveness of R&D in selected areas (BT-Drs., 1984; 
BMBF, 2000). The DPF scheme has become the most important tool used by the national 
government to support private businesses’ R&D. Therefore, the focus in this paper is set on 
this tool. 
The DPF scheme offers grant aid funding for R&D projects in predefined fields of 
technology. Targeted areas include ICT, biotechnology, optical technology, transport 
technology, space technology, environmental and energy technologies, health research and 
medical technology. The fields of technology are selected by the government and the financial 
support is thematically restrictive to these technologies. Within the technology fields several 
programs are defined which include funding objectives and rules. These programs run for 
several years, are made public through calls and applications have to be made within defined 
dates. Either companies or research institutions – or both together in a joint project – submit 
project-based applications for funding. In most programs, applications based on a cooperation 
of firms and research institutions are recommended though not obligatory. Program agencies 
authorized by the government and responsible for specific thematic areas decide on the 
application. The criteria for approving a project do not differ between firms that have already 
participated in the scheme and firms which want to participate for the first time.3 The funding 
is granted on a cost sharing basis. Up to 50 percent of the R&D project costs are covered by 
the government. Thus, the funding directly reduces firms’ R&D costs. 
Within the empirical analysis an issue arises due to the mechanisms of the subsidy allocation 
process. The allocation of subsidies is based on a multi-stage decision-making process. First 
of all, the company needs to be aware of the program in order to apply. Secondly, before 
submitting a proposal it is usually recommended in the guidelines of the funding programs 
that companies should contact the program agency. Communication with the program agency 
may lead to a withdrawal or redesign of the application. Finally, the application can be 
rejected by the agency. Thus, there are several points where the application process can be 
broken off. The government does not report data on these issues, such as rejection rates or the 
share of applications being withdrawn by the applicant after contacting the program agency 
                                                 
3 In contrast, for example, within the SBIR program additional criteria apply for the evaluation of SBIR 
applications of firms who had received awards in the past (Lerner, 1999). 
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(BT-Drs., 2005). Therefore, I cannot differentiate between the different reasons why a firm 
does not participate in the funding scheme. A similar problem occurs in many other studies.4 
Hypotheses for Empirical Analysis 
The government states in its program guidelines that public financial support to firm R&D 
should be only temporary. “Support programmes run for several years. It is important that 
they be properly balanced: On the one hand, applications need a certain amount of time in 
order to reach maturity; on the other hand, they should not become permanently dependent on 
support” (BMBF, 2005). A permanent alimentation of specific research areas and thus of 
firms is not intended (BT-Drs., 1979; BMBF, 2004). 
The first question to analyze is whether the same firms receive the new allocated subsidies 
over time so that some firms receive public money permanently. Though the intention of the 
government is not to support firms permanently, there are several reasons why the same firms 
might be receiving the new grants. First, firms who have participated in the scheme might 
realize learning effects. They can use their experience for submitting a successful application. 
They might also be more capable of rating which R&D projects might be suitable for funding. 
In addition, the transaction costs might be less for them since the effort for submitting a 
(additional) proposal is smaller. Secondly, due to asymmetric information not all eligible 
firms are aware of the funding opportunity and do not submit an application. Therefore, the 
probability of receiving further subsidies is higher for firms which have successfully applied 
for funding in the past. Moreover firms which have already participated in the support scheme 
might know the support opportunities better than the other firms. Thirdly, a firm may have 
specific characteristics which increase its probability of success or it may belong to a group of 
firms who enjoy priority treatment by the government, for example, because of their location, 
sector activity or technology specialization. Considering the argumentation in favor of a more 
stable participation pattern, it is assumed that a rather persistent participation pattern will be 
found due to an augmented allocation of new grants to previously participating firms. 
Program agencies’ decisions are based on the proposed R&D projects, not on firm 
characteristics. But information on the project-level is not available for not subsidized 
projects. However, it can be analyzed which firms had submitted successful applications and 
received new DPF grants. Thus the second question to answer is what types of firms are 
participants and are thus actually addressed by the government’s subsidy program. Looking at 
the government’s reasoning for running the DPF scheme, i.e. funding of R&D projects with 
high economic and technical risk, long time horizon and budget requirements that go beyond 
the capabilities of a single firm which not would have been carried out without the public 
support, it can be assumed that this applies more likely to small and young firms due to their 
limited resources. Thus the probability that applications from these firms are selected and 
approved by the program agency should be higher. Another reason why smaller firms are 
                                                 
4 The only exceptions are basically studies for Finland, such as those of, for example, Ali-Yrkkö (2005) or 
Tanayama (2007), since the number of rejected applications are known. 
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more likely to be chosen by program agencies is that small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SME) have become a key target group of innovation policy in Germany (BMBF, 2004). 
They have started activities which focus on promoting and supporting SMEs. Also in the DPF 
scheme special attention is paid to SMEs. Thus, the probability that program agencies 
approve project proposals should be higher for SMEs. 
On the other hand large firms may have information advantages because they are able to 
provide more resources for tracing funding opportunities, since the costs can be spread over 
more revenue. Therefore, large firms may have a higher probability of applying to R&D 
funding schemes. Overall size is expected to be an important variable in explaining the 
participation in the public support program although the direction of the impact is ambiguous. 
The final goal of the government when offering subsidies to firms is to increase their 
competitiveness. Program agencies might think that certain firms are more capable of 
achieving this and favor more experienced and capable firms or firms which are already on a 
high level of technology or on a promising path (picking-the-winner strategy). Thus regular 
R&D activities and human capital might positively influence the agencies’ decisions. 
Furthermore, firms with a high patent stock compared to other firms in their industry might be 
in a more favorable position to achieve international competitiveness and thus have the 
advantage of being awarded by the agencies. Furthermore, firms with impressive growth rates 
in the past might be more likely to be successfully selected in the program. If the firm is 
subsidized in the previous years, this growth can also be an effect of the previous support. 
This could be an indicator that the project had a positive effect and the firm might have an 
advantage to get further projects granted. 
3 Previous Empirical Studies 
In the empirical literature there are several studies which include an analysis of firms’ 
participation in public R&D programs. This is often related to investigating the effects of 
public funding on firms’ R&D inputs or outputs. In order to analyze this question 
appropriately a potential selection bias has to be taken into account. For this purpose the 
determinants of receiving public funding have to be analyzed. There are only a few papers 
however, which consider receiving subsidies over time by including at least one variable for 
the previous receipt of public awards. 
Duguet (2004) is one of these exceptions. He looks at the subsidy status at the firm-level in 
two consecutive years within the time period between 1985 and 1997 and identifies the entries 
and exits. The overall receipt of R&D subsidies from any national ministry is taken into 
account. About a quarter of the firms are subsidized in two consecutive years whereas about 
60 percent are not subsidized in the previous and current year. The entry and exit rates vary 
between 5 and 9 percent per year. He concludes that the stability of recipients in his sample is 
rather strong. Estimating the probability of receiving subsidies, he finds that both the former 
receipt of subsidies and the average amount of subsidies have a significantly positive effect. 
González et al. (2005) use an unbalanced panel data set of Spanish manufacturing firms and 
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aggregate subsidies from varies sources, such as regional, national and EU programs. They 
estimate firms’ expectations of subsidies. Controlling for other firm characteristics they find 
that the subsidy dummies lagged by one period and by two periods both have a significantly 
positive influence on the receipt of a subsidy. Tanayama (2007) focuses on the application 
process for R&D subsidies by the Finish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation 
(Tekes) via the number of filed applications between 2000 and 2002 in her study. She finds 
that the number of applications before 2000 increases both the probability of being a potential 
applicant for the subsidy scheme and the number of filed applications conditional on being a 
potential applicant. Feldman and Kelley (2001) investigate factors influencing the decision to 
grant an Advanced Technology Program (ATP) award in 1998. Explaining winning an ATP 
award the two variables concerning the ATP experience, namely first-time application to ATP 
and number of previous ATP awards, have – in contrast to the other studies – no significant 
effect.5 
It seems that a firm’s subsidy history has an impact on the receipt of further awards but it is 
not unambiguous. In most studies analysis of experience effects are not program specific but 
rather aggregate regional, national and European-wide program participation into one single 
experience measure. But allocation rules differ between programs as was shown in a study by 
Blanes and Busom (2004). All of the studies except the one by Feldman and Kelley (2001) 
and Tanayama (2007) have neglected that a subsidy is often given for longer time period than 
one year. In such a case the same grant is responsible for the subsidization of a firm for two 
consecutive years and the identified effect might be overestimated.  
This review makes it clear that firm-level empirical evidence on persistence in participation of 
subsidy programs is rather scarce and not very detailed. I want to contribute to this literature 
by controlling for these two mentioned shortcomings. I focus on one specific support scheme 
– the DPF scheme – and take into account the duration of the subsidized projects to correct 
for a bias due to longer lasting projects. Therefore, I am particularly interested in the question 
of which firms receive the new awarded grants. Furthermore, it is the first time that 
information is provided with respect to previous firm participation in the DPF scheme for the 
population of awarded DPF grants. 
4 Stylized Facts of the German DPF scheme 
Information on the Federal Government’s DPF scheme is collected in a separate database 
called PROFI. This database encompasses detailed information on all projects funded under 
the DPF scheme, including starting and end dates of the funded projects, amount of public 
funding, total project costs and all names of firms and public research organizations involved 
in the project. The database serves as the basis for the description of the DPF scheme. Public 
financing of R&D projects by the way of contract research is excluded from the data set. 
                                                 
5 An overview of all empirical studies analyzing the probability of receiving subsidies is shown in Table 5 in the 
appendix. 
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Regarding the overall trend in the DPF scheme in the last 25 years, the number of projects and 
firms funded each year has changed considerably. In the early 1980s, on average about 2,600 
projects of about 1,000 different private firms were funded every year with more than 900 
million euros of public funding per year. By the year 2005 the number of projects increased 
by a factor of about 1.6 and the number of involved firms by a factor of 2.5. At the same time 
the amount of the public subsidies decreased by 50 percent in the same period.  
Since a project is subsidized on average for about three years, about one third of the projects 
to be observed for a particular year have begun in that year. In 1980 there were almost 800 
starting projects which were carried out by about 400 different firms (see Figure 1).6 The 
number of firms with new projects remained the same until 1992 and then began to increase. 
The peak in 2001 is due to the temporarily expanded budget for the DPF scheme. This was 
financed by the savings from the interest from the appropriation of the revenues of the auction 
of the UMTS licenses for public debt repayment. The number of new projects and firms 
involved therein has developed similarly to the overall trend. In recent years around 1,500 
new projects in almost 1,200 different firms were subsidized. Consequently, a lot more firms 
receive subsidies but each firm has fewer subsidized projects on average and the average 
award amount also decreased.  
Figure 1: Number of firms with new projects subsidized in the DPF scheme, 
controlling for the period since the firm was last subsidized (in years), 
1980-2006  
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Note: Last year: Firm had a subsidized project last year; 2-5 years: Firm had subsidized projects between 
2 and 5 years ago; 6 years or more: Firm had a subsidized project 6 or more years ago; first time: Firm 
participates in the DPF scheme for the first time. Source: PROFI database; own calculations. 
                                                 
6 The classification of firms whether they are subsidized or not is based on the announced period of the project. 
For example, when a project runs from August 2002 until March 2004 the firm is marked as being subsidized 
from 2002 to 2004. This does not necessarily correspond exactly to the years when the firm receives the 
payments. Since often the last payment is made in the year or the second year after the expiration of the project, 
the calculated transition rates (next section) are not biased due to delayed payments. 
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Since the main interest is the participation pattern in the funding scheme over time, I 
decompose the number of firms with newly subsidized projects in a year in terms of their 
participation history. A look at the firms’ funding history reveals that in the early 1980s 30 to 
40 percent of the participating businesses received subsidies for the first time.7 As new 
technology areas were emphasized and funding was increasingly directed towards SMEs, the 
share of first time participants increased in the 1990s to 50 to 60 percent and remained at that 
level. In the meantime, however, the total number of firms that have participated in the DPF 
scheme at least once has increased substantially. 
The share of firms which receive subsidies occasionally is rather low as shown by the share of 
firms that were last funded two or more years ago. This indicates that once a firm exits the 
program and does not receive subsidies anymore, it is not very probable that this firm will re-
enter the program.  
From the perspective of the DPF scheme – by looking at all participating firms – some 
dynamic is detected within the scheme since about 40 percent of firms who get starting 
projects in a specific year participate for the first time. In order to assess the participation 
pattern further it is necessary to relate these subsidized firms to all firms, i.e. the population of 
firms. The PROFI database only includes participating firms since it is based on information 
on the subsidized projects.  
5 Data Set and Some Statistics 
Data Set 
This analysis intends to examine the program participation structure in Germany in a dynamic 
context. The focus is set on the allocation of new grants and the corresponding role of the 
firm’s previous participation. I use a representative sample of the population of firms so that it 
consists of both participants of the DPF scheme and non-participating firms who might be 
potential applicants. The sample used is based on the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), an 
annual innovation survey conducted by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) 
on behalf of the BMBF since 1993. The MIP is the German part of the European-wide 
harmonized Community Innovation Survey (CIS). It is a stratified random sample of firms 
according to firm size, industry and region. I pool the observations from all years to one 
dataset. Then I merge this firm level data with subsidy data which is extracted from the 
PROFI database. An advantage of this PROFI data set is that in contrast to other studies it 
contains information on subsidies on a project-level. Thus the exact duration of the projects is 
known and it is possible to identify the years in which firms have newly granted projects or 
                                                 
7 Since the PROFI database begins in 1973, it is not possible to control for subsidies given before that year. This 
data restriction might result in a slight shift from the group of firms which were funded six or more years ago to 
the first time funded firms where the firms were subsidized before 1973. But this bias is assumed to be rather 
small and therefore negligible since the share of firms who re-enter the program after nine years is fairly low. 
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whether projects are just ongoing.8 The project-level data about the subsidies is aggregated to 
the firm-level because the analysis is carried out on the firm-level. The firm’s subsidy status is 
known for every year since the subsidy information is extracted from another database which 
covers all years. Thus it is not necessary to observe the firm in two consecutive years in order 
to calculate transition rates for the subsidy status from one year to another.  
Basically the programs within the DPF scheme are open to all firms. But naturally the DPF 
scheme is only interesting for firms if a program is placed within the industry in which the 
firm is active. Therefore, I restrict the sample to firms from the manufacturing sector and 
selected knowledge intensive services since the DPF scheme mainly targets these branches.9 
Furthermore, I keep only observations for which all variables needed in the multivariate 
analysis are given.10 In the end, the sample consists of about 6,800 different firms covering 
the manufacturing sector from 1994 to 2005 and the knowledge intensive service sectors since 
1996. In addition, it can be presumed that R&D subsidies are more relevant for firms which 
seek innovations. Therefore I mark the firms which are engaged in innovative activities, i.e. 
their innovative expenditures are positive in t. About 5,200 of these firms have innovative 
activities. 
Since participation in the survey is not obligatory for firms, the observed firms change from 
year to year in the dataset. Over 40 percent of the firms from the whole sample are only 
observed once. About 18 percent of the firms are surveyed for two years, less than one 
percent for all 12 years. Overall the sample consists of 19,265 observations, of which 12,797 
are from firms with innovating activities (for firms’ observation pattern see Table 7 in the 
appendix). 
Descriptive Results 
The sample includes firms who participated in the DPF scheme and firms who did not 
participate. The share of firms who received funding in the DPF scheme is shown in Figure 2. 
Firms with positive innovation expenditures serve as a basis for calculating the share of 
subsidized firms. In the manufacturing sector the share of firms who participated in the 
funding scheme remained around 8 percent from 1994 till 2000. Between 2001 and 2003 it 
increased to 13 percent and then decreased again to its initial level. For the firms in the 
knowledge intensive service sectors basically the same pattern can be observed but at a three 
percentage points lower level on average. In 2006 the share of DPF recipients converged to 
the level in the manufacturing sector. The overall slight increase of subsidized firms between 
2001 and 2003 can be explained by the overall increase of firms participating in the funding 
scheme in this period as shown in section 3. 
                                                 
8 The classification of firms according to whether they are subsidized or not is based on the announced period of 
the project. 
9 Table 6 in the appendix for an overview of the included sectors. 
10 In addition, firms with more than 10,000 employees are dropped since for these firms the assignment of the 
subsidies is fairly difficult. 
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Figure 2: Share of innovating firms which receive DPF, 1994-2006 
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Notes: Innovating firms are firms with positive innovation expenditures. Contract research is not taken 
into account. Source: Own calculations. 
As shown a certain share of firms participate every year in the DPF scheme. However, the 
graph does not exhibit whether the same firms receive subsidies over time or whether and to 
what extent firms enter and exit the subsidy scheme. In order to analyze this issue, the 
transition rates between being subsidized and not subsidized – ongoing or newly subsidized – 
are calculated and presented in Table 1.  
Table 1: Transition rates  
   Status in t+1 
Status in t No. of obs. Not subsidized
Ongoing 
subsidized
Newly 
subsidized Total
      
Whole sample   
Not subsidized 17,780 98.80 0.00 1.20 100.0
Subsidized 1,485 17.31 58.92 23.77 100.0
Total 19,265 92.47 4.69 2.84 100.0
   
Sub-sample of innovating firmsa  
Not subsidized  11,312 98.25 0.00 1.75 100.0
Subsidized 1,485 17.31 58.92 23.77 100.0
Total  12,797 88.86 6.84 4.31 100.0
Note: a Innovating firms are firms with positive innovation expenditures in t. Firms which have newly 
subsidized projects may additionally have ongoing subsidized projects. 
Looking at the whole sample it becomes apparent that the subsidization status is fairly 
permanent. Almost 99 percent of the firms who do not participate in the funding scheme in 
year t, do not receive this type of funding in the following year. Thus the share of firms who 
enter the funding scheme is extremely low. Thereby, no upward or downward trend of the 
yearly transition rates can be observed.11 Considering the non-subsidized firms in t who also 
                                                 
11 Table of yearly transition rates for not subsidized firms in t can be found in Table 8 in the appendix. 
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had no innovation activities in that period, the probability of them innovating by conducting 
R&D in t+1 and receiving subsidies is even below 0.3 percent. Virtually all of the newly 
subsidized firms in t+1 are firms which had already undertaken some type of innovation 
activities – almost always R&D activities – in t. Thus, it can be concluded that the funding 
scheme is not a method of stimulating firms to undertake R&D activities. But this is also not a 
goal of this support scheme.  
The status of the subsidized firms is constant to a large extent. Over 80 percent of the 
subsidized firms maintained their status in the following period while almost 20 percent did 
not receive further funding and dropped out of the funding scheme.12 Compared to the results 
of the study conducted by Duguet (2004) who considers R&D subsidies from national 
ministries in France, a slightly higher dynamic can be observed in France. Recalculating the 
given percentages in his study it turns out that, for example, 7.5 percent of the firms without 
subsidies in 1996 receive subsidies in the following year. Given that a firm is subsidized in 
1996, 75.6 percent of these firms also got subsidies in 1997. 
However, it has to be considered that grants once approved in the DPF scheme last for several 
years, about three years on average. Continuation rates will be overestimated if the persistence 
due to multi-year projects is not taken into account. Therefore, the subsidized status is split in 
t+1. A distinction is made between firms which have newly subsidized projects – and 
additionally maybe ongoing funded projects – and firms which have only ongoing subsidized 
projects. It turns out that a little more than 20 percent of the subsidized firms in t start actual 
newly subsidized projects in t+1. About 60 percent of the subsidized firms receive subsidies 
in t+1 due to the fact that projects are approved for several years. Thus, the probability for 
firms to receive further funding in a new project is six percentage points higher than the 
probability of dropping out of the scheme (23.8% vs. 17.3%). The results show that once a 
firm has made it into the DPF scheme which is rather rare event, the probability of getting 
DPF grants for a new project in the following year is more likely than dropping out of the 
scheme. 
Table 2 gives some more information on the dynamic of subsidization for innovating firms by 
their sector and size class. Looking at the firms’ sector, the share of firms which enter the 
scheme in the manufacturing sector is about twice as high as in the service sector. This is not 
surprising since R&D activities are more frequently undertaken in manufacturing firms. 
Differences in the transition rates for subsidized firms between the industry and service 
sectors are rather small. Differences in the transition rates are more pronounced with respect 
to firm size. Both the probability of switching into the subsidization status and that of staying 
in this status increases with firm size. Therefore, the overall share of subsidized firms is 
higher for large firms than for small ones. As the next step, I want to identify firm-specific 
                                                 
12 Taking into account that in 2000 and since 2002 some firms which had received subsidies were added to the 
sample, the number of firms which are funded in t is higher than otherwise, but the inclusion of these 
observations does not have a severe effect on the transition rates. For example, the transition rate of firms which 
remain subsidized from t to t+1 even slightly increases from 82 to 85 for the sample when the extra firms were 
dropped. To check the representativeness of the sample, Table 9 in the appendix compares the transition rates for 
the subsidized firms in t of the population and the sample in each year. It turns out that the firms also subsidized 
in t+1 are slightly over-represented in the sample. But the bias is rather small. 
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factors which influence the probability of getting DPF grants for a new project in the 
subsequent period conditional on whether a firm is subsidized in period t. For not subsidized 
firms in t this is the probability of entering the scheme, for subsidized firms this means 
renewing the subsidization status with a new DPF grant. 
Table 2: Transition rates of innovating firms by firms’ sector and size class 
Status   Sector  Size Class 
in t in t+1   Manu. Service  <50 50-249 >=250 
Not subs. Not subs.   98.04 99.05 99.26 98.40 96.15
 Ongoing subs.   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 Newly subs.   1.96 0.95 0.74 1.60 3.85
 Total   100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
    
Subs. Not subs.   16.97 18.42 20.42 17.38 14.64
 Ongoing subs.   58.97 58.77 59.37 58.47 58.91
 Newly subs.   24.06 22.81 20.21 24.15 26.46
 Total   100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
No. of obs.    10,133 2,664  5,320 4,311 3,166
Notes: a Innovating firms are firms with positive innovation expenditures in t. Firms which have newly 
subsidized projects may additionally have ongoing subsidized projects. 
6 Econometric Analysis 
Econometric Model 
In this section the dynamics of firms’ participation in the German DPF scheme are 
investigated in a multivariate context. It concentrates on the probability of a transition from 
one state of subsidization to another in the next period. In particular I am interested in the 
question of which firms receive the new awarded DPF grants conditional on whether the firms 
receive subsidies in the previous period. Therefore, I focus on entry into the scheme and 
getting new projects approved if already in the scheme. In order to estimate these transitions I 
use the approach of markov chains which is seen as a powerful instrument for analyzing 
dynamic economic phenomena (e.g. Nguyen Van et al., 2004). I use a model based on 
Gouriéroux (2000) and applied by, for example, Nguyen Van et al. (2004) in the context of 
transitions between different states of firm performance or Fryges (2007) who analyzed 
changes between sales modes used by firms in international markets. 
Let Yit denote the status of subsidization j of firm i in time t and takes value 1 if firm i has a 
newly approved grant in t and value 0 otherwise. Assuming a logistic form for the transition 
probabilities and a set of explanatory variables x, the probability of transition of firm i from 
state j in t to state j′ in t+1 is given by 
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with j = 0, 1. Consequently, each row of a transition matrix can be estimated by a binary logit 
model, assuming two possible states in t+1. Let us define ni,t,t+1(jj′) = 1 if firm i occupies status 
j in t and status j’ in t+1, and 0 otherwise. Then the log-likelihood conditional on the state 
occupied at time t is 
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Because the quantity ∑ =1 0'j 'jjLln only depends on βj1, the maximum likelihood estimator 1jβˆ  
can be obtained by separate maximization of the elements of ∑ =1 0'j 'jjLln , where j = 0, 1. 
By applying logit models it is possible to identify firm-specific factors which influence the 
probability of switching the subsidy status between two periods. I apply a logit type model 
that firstly explains the transition from the non-subsidized status in t to being subsidized in 
t+1, i.e. subsidy program entry. The share of firms who change their status, i.e. enter the 
scheme, is rather small compared to the event of remaining non-subsidized. King and Zeng 
(2001) show that the maximum likelihood estimator βˆ  is biased in rare events data in finite 
samples because the probability of the rare event is underestimated – in this case the 
estimated probability 01iPˆ . They introduce a bias-correcting estimator β~  and derive an 
analytical approximation for estimating the probability Pi01 as  
iii
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where the correct factor Ci is 
iiiiii x)
~(Varx)P~(P~)P~.(C ′−−= 01010101 150 β .13        (6) 
                                                 
13 For simplicity, I have neglected the time subscript t in this formula. 
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The estimator 01iP?  + Ci, which is denoted as an approximate Bayesian estimator, is less biased 
– though not completely unbiased – but it is superior in the sense that it has a smaller mean 
square error than other estimators of Pi11 (King and Zeng, 2001). Thus, I apply this rare event 
logit model to estimate the first element of the log-likelihood function in equation (4), i.e. the 
entry into the DPF program.  
Secondly, the transition from participating in the subsidy scheme in t to getting a new project 
subsidized in t+1 – renewing the subsidization status – is examined by means of a 
conventional logit model. If a firm gets a DPF grant for a new project in t+1, the dependent 
variable equals 1. If a firm takes on value 0 for the dependent variable in t+1 it does not 
necessarily exit the subsidization status completely because firms may have ongoing 
subsidized projects. But it implies that the firm does not receive a grant for a new project in 
t+1. The two states of being not subsidized at all in t+1 and having ongoing subsidized 
projects in t+1 are combined. In these two states ‘nothing’ really happens to the firm.  
I assume that the participation pattern follows a first-order Markov process, i.e. the state in 
t+1 only depends on the state of the previous period t. A Markov-chain of higher order is not 
necessary because the status of t includes both newly and ongoing subsidized firms. 
Therefore, a large share of these firms is also subsidized in the prior period t−1 or before due 
to the average duration of approved projects. Instead I use an additional exogenous variable − 
the number of projects that were granted within the last five years (between t−4 and t) − 
which accounts for the overall experience with the funding scheme based on the firm’s DPF 
history. This ensures that each earlier funded project is counted only once.  
An alternative model to analyze persistence could be a dynamic panel discrete choice model. 
However due to the limited number of observations in specific and consecutive years and the 
few status changes between the years this model cannot be applied. Due to the lack of time 
series data for the firms, a survival analysis would also be not very meaningful since it cannot 
change over time. Instead, I pool the data from the different years. 
Econometric Implementation 
The selection of variables used to explain the allocation of new DPF grants is based primarily 
on the hypotheses described in section 2 and on the results of previous empirical studies (see 
Table 5 in the appendix). The means of the explanatory variables are presented in Table 3, 
separately for the four possible state combinations of the dependent variables. 
Subsidy-related variables 
Previous experience with the DPF scheme is assumed to have a positive effect on the 
probability of entering the subsidy program again. There are various reasons for this as 
explained in section 2. In order to analyze whether the experience with this specific subsidy 
scheme has an effect beyond the status at time t which is given, the variable DPF history is 
generated. It contains the number of approved projects within the preceding five years, i.e. 
between t−4 and t. By counting the projects the experience that the firm has gathered is 
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revealed. Regarding the sample of non-subsidized firms in t, 26 percent of the firms who 
switch into the subsidy scheme had at least one subsidized project between t−4 and t−1. This 
share is only 3 percent for the firms who discontinue subsidization in t+1. Regarding the firms 
that were subsidized in t, the most successful firm in terms of getting projects approved in the 
last five years has 21 beginning projects. The average DPF history variable is also 
significantly higher for firms who get further funding via a new project in t+1. These firms 
have, on average, 3.5 subsidized projects within the last five years, i.e. about twice as many as 
firms with no or no new projects in t+1. 
Table 3: Comparison of means of the explanatory variables 
Status in t  Not subsidized    Subsidized 
Status in t+1  Not subs. Subs.a   Not newly subs. Newly subs.  
DPF history t-4? t  0.029 0.258 ***  1.708 3.476 ***
Ongoing t+1  0.000 0.000   0.773 0.878 ***
Sub_EU t-2? t  0.052 0.157 ***  0.224 0.397 ***
Sub_regional t-2? t  0.139 0.293 ***  0.307 0.456 ***
Sub_supply t+1  3.585 4.982 ***  4.677 5.406 ***
Ln(Employees)  4.225 5.380 ***  4.805 5.235 ***
Employees change  0.029 0.051   0.040 0.065 * 
Ln(Age)  2.728 2.798   2.728 2.685  
R&D_no   0.276 0.051 ***  0.000 0.000  
R&D_occ  0.237 0.152 ***  0.151 0.062 ***
R&D_con  0.486 0.798 ***  0.849 0.938 ***
Qualification   0.213 0.263 ***  0.340 0.387 ***
Patent_stock_dev  0.634 2.647 ***  3.204 5.105 ** 
Group national  0.362 0.414   0.418 0.476 * 
Group foreign  0.095 0.116   0.135 0.122  
East  0.336 0.333   0.317 0.419 ***
Low tech ma.  0.150 0.086 **  0.062 0.025 ***
Med-low tech ma.  0.256 0.187 **  0.138 0.153  
Med-high tech ma.  0.268 0.389 ***  0.318 0.269 * 
High tech ma.  0.120 0.227 ***  0.249 0.331 ***
Low tech service  0.123 0.051 ***  0.106 0.066 ** 
High tech service  0.083 0.061   0.127 0.156  
No. of obs.   11,114 198   1,132 353  
Notes: a All firms which do not receive subsidies in t and enter the program in t+1 are newly subsidized. 
*** (**,*) indicates that the means are significantly different on the level of 1% (5%, 10%) based on a t-
Test. Unless otherwise specified the explanatory variables refer to time t. Time dummies are not shown. 
It is also controlled for whether a firm still gets subsidies from ongoing projects in t+1 with 
the help of the dummy variable Ongoing. The question is whether the currently ongoing 
contact with the program agency has an additional positive impact on the likelihood of 
receiving further projects. On the other hand the variable indicates when it takes the value 0, 
i.e. if the firm does not get a new project granted in t+1 then it will drop out of the scheme 
because it has no ongoing projects in t+1. Thus these firms might be especially eager to get a 
new project funded. 
In order to control for experience with other sources of subsidies, dummy variables are 
included to indicate whether the firm received subsidies from a European (Sub_EU) or a 
regional (Sub_regional) funding scheme within the preceding three year period t−2 to t. On 
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one hand firms who participate in a broad range of funding programs probably know the 
subsidy system with its funding opportunities quite well and have a lot of expertise in 
applying for and getting public grants. On the other hand, the DPF scheme might particularly 
support firms which do not get other subsidies. However if the firms apply to other sources 
for subsidies for projects unrelated to DPF, these subsidy sources are usually unknown to the 
agencies that decide on the DPF projects. Therefore a positive effect of applying and granting 
is expected. The comparison of means shows that firms with new subsidized projects in t+1 
also get subsidies from the two other sources of funding significantly more often than the 
other firms.  
From time to time the government launches sub-programs within the DPF scheme in ‘new’ 
technology areas or shifts the focus from one area of research to another. Firms from other 
industries might be addressed so that new firms are recorded – naturally – within the DPF 
scheme. In contrast in other technology areas where programs end the chances of getting a 
new DPF grant decrease. In order to take these shifts over time into account in the estimation, 
the variable Sub_supply is generated which includes the amount of subsidies (in 10 million 
euros) which are approved for starting projects within a certain industry in year t+1. It is a 
proxy for the supply of subsidies for a firm. This variable is constructed based on the PROFI 
database and represents the population of the DPF scheme.14  Comparing the firms with newly 
subsidized projects and with no (new) projects it becomes apparent that the supply of 
subsidies is larger for firms with approved projects. Wallsten (2000) constructed a similar 
variable in his study which approximates the SBIR budget potentially available to each firm, 
depending on the type of research. He found a positive effect of this variable on the 
probability of winning a SBIR Phase I and II award. 
Other variables  
As explained in section 0, firm size is expected to be an important variable in explaining the 
participation in the DPF program though the direction of the impact is ambiguous. A firm’s 
size is measured by the number of employees in logarithms (Employees). The comparison of 
means exhibits that firms with newly subsidized projects are significantly larger than those 
firms without (new) projects.  
Besides the level of the employees, the change in the number of employees between t−1 and t 
relative to the number of employees in t−1 is also included in the regressions 
(Employees_change). Firms who are already on a growth path may most likely be picked by 
the program agency in order to augment this development. If the firm has been subsidized in 
the previous years this growth can also be an effect of the public support. However looking at 
the descriptive statistics the average firm growth is not significantly larger for firms who enter 
the scheme than for the current not subsidized firms. Indeed employment growth is slightly 
larger for the subsidized firms which get a new DPF grant. 
                                                 
14 The programs within the DPF scheme are linked to technology areas which cannot be directly converted into 
industries, for example, based on the NACE classification. However, in order to control for the supply, the 
industries to which the participating firms belong to are taken into account. 
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Young firms should also enjoy special attention under the Federal innovation policy. Young 
high-tech firms may suffer from a lack of financial capacity due to insufficient resources of 
their own and limited access to capital markets. However, the DPF scheme does not focus on 
start-up firms in particular though there are some sub-programs which target high-tech start-
ups, for example, BioChance in the biotechnology field. Whether age plays an actual role in 
receiving subsidies is examined by the logarithm of a firm’s age (in years, Age). The mean of 
a firm’s age does not exhibit a significant difference between the groups.  
Overall, the sample is restricted to firms with positive innovation expenditures. However this 
does not necessarily imply that the firms actively conduct R&D. Innovation expenditures also 
include expenditures for extramural R&D, the acquisition of machinery, software or other 
external knowledge etc. Since the DPF scheme is directed towards R&D activities the past 
conducting of these activities indicates the experience with R&D and the accumulated 
knowledge in R&D. Furthermore firms with in-house R&D might also be aware of potential 
support programs offered. Thus in-house R&D activities probably enhance the probability of 
applying to the DPF scheme. The program agency might also favor firms with the capability 
to carry out R&D. The variable R&D_occ (R&D_con) indicates that the firm performs R&D 
on an occasional (continuous) basis. A proportion of the not subsidized firms in t may also 
have no such activities (R&D_no). Continuous R&D activities are significantly more often 
observed for newly subsidized firms.  
In addition to R&D activities, another measure of firms’ capabilities to generate and acquire 
knowledge is included in the regressions – the share of employees with a university degree 
(Qualification). Since qualified employees within the R&D process increase the human 
capital within R&D and the absorptive capacity, more ideas for future R&D projects are 
generated (Blanes and Busom, 2004). Hence the pool of potential R&D projects is larger and 
thus the probability of promising projects among them increases. Qualified employees in the 
administration area might be more successful in fund-raising for R&D projects (Czarnitzki 
and Fier, 2002). Therefore this variable is expected to have a positive effect on the likelihood 
of applying for a subsidy and this being approved by the program agency. Indeed firms with 
new DPF grants have a higher share of qualified personnel.  
A proxy variable for a firm’s capacity to create new knowledge is its patent stock. Firms have 
proved to be able to transfer R&D into inventions which is one of the main success criterion 
under the DPF scheme. This variable is generated by depreciating the sum of all patent 
applications which were filed at the European Patent Office since 1979 until t. The 
depreciation rate is constant and equals 0.15, which is common in the literature (e.g. Hall, 
1990).15 Since the patent behavior varies between industries, the variable used in the 
regressions is scaled to the industry mean and measures the deviation rate from the industry 
average (2-digit-level, Patent_stock_dev). The descriptive statistics show that firms with a 
higher patent stock, when compared to the industry, on average both enter into the scheme 
and renew their status with new grants more often. 
                                                 
15 The resulting formula for the calculation of the patent stock of firm i at time t is: Patent_stockit = (1 − DR) * 
Patent_stockit-1 + PA it where DR is the Depreciation Rate and PA the number of filed patent applications. 
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Firms which belong to a company group might benefit from this membership due to 
knowledge transfers within the group. However, SMEs which belong to a group with a large 
parent company are then not eligible anymore for DPF sub-programs designed for SMEs. The 
DPF scheme might also be oriented in particular towards domestic firms since the 
government wants to generate economic effects located in Germany. Two corresponding 
dummy variables are included in the regression. Group_national takes on the value 1 if the 
firm is part of domestic company group. If the firm has a foreign headquarter then 
Group_foreign equals 1. In the descriptive statistics no significant difference can be observed. 
In Germany there is a special situation due the reunification in 1989. The Eastern part is still 
significantly behind in terms of productivity and large transfer payments and promotion 
programs are directed to this geographic region. The DPF scheme is not part of this system 
and does not focus particularly on firms located in the Eastern part, except the two sub-
programs InnoRegio and Innovative Regional Growth Cores. However, due to still existing 
differences between the West and the East, I include a dummy variable (East) for firms 
located in Eastern Germany in the regressions. With regard to entering into the scheme there 
is no systematic difference. However once firms have entered the scheme and are subsidized, 
firms from the Eastern part are more likely to receive subsidies for new projects. To capture 
additional industry specific effects dummy variables are included in the regressions indicating 
the sector to which a firm belongs to. The sectors are defined based on the technology-level 
(OECD, 2003). In addition, year dummies should control for temporal heterogeneity. Since 
the dependent variables refer to period t+1, all explanatory variables are lagged by one period 
except the measure for the subsidy supply. This reduces potential endogeneity problems. 
To identify the determinants for the receipt of new DPF grants conditional on being 
subsidized in the preceding period basically the same variables are used as for the explaining 
of entering into the DPF scheme. In order to get further projects approved it can be assumed 
that firms had to prove themselves in previously DPF supported projects. However in this 
case variables indicating the success of former subsidized projects are not available and so 
cannot be taken into account. Instead firm variables are included in order to detect which 
characteristics these firms have. It is also possible that receiving DPF funding over a long 
time may have changed firm characteristics. Comparing the firms with new DPF grants in t+1 
who do not receive subsidies in t, with the firms who received subsidies in t, it becomes 
apparent that in fact most explanatory variables differ. 
Empirical Results 
The results of the regressions are presented in Table 4.16 The second column includes the 
vector of coefficients which explain the transition from the status non-participant at time t to 
the status participant at time t+1, i.e. entry into the DPF scheme.17 The fourth column shows 
                                                 
16 The results were obtained using the statistical software package STATA, version 10.1 MP. For the estimations 
of the rare events logit model, I used a program written by Michael Tomz, Gary King, and Langche Zeng, which 
is available at http://gking.harvard.edu (King and Zeng, 2001).  
17 By applying a conventional logit model the coefficients increase or decrease slightly and the standard errors 
are slightly larger. However the category of the significance level of the variables remains the same. 
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the coefficients which discriminate between firms that have a newly approved project in t+1 
and those which do not, conditional on being subsidized in t. In columns three and five the 
respective marginal changes, calculated as first differences, are shown. 
Table 4: Regression results 
 Not subsidized ? subsidized  Subsidized ? newly subsidized 
 Rare events logit model   Logit model 
Variable Coefficient   FD  Coefficient  FD 
 (Std. Err.)    (Std. Err.)  
DPF history t-4? t 1.252 *** 0.0215  0.333 *** 0.0487
 (0.176)   (0.045)  
Ongoing t+1    0.220  0.0352
    (0.201)  
Sub_EU t-2? t 0.509 ** 0.0058  0.320 ** 0.0555
 (0.234)   (0.151)  
Sub_regional t-2? t 0.570 *** 0.0066  0.107  0.0180
 (0.213)   (0.153)  
Sub_supply t+1 0.054 *** 0.0002  0.041 ** 0.0033
 (0.016)   (0.018)  
Ln(Employees) 0.544 *** 0.0000  0.217 *** 0.0015
 (0.054)   (0.060)  
Employees_change 0.345  0.0003  0.529 * 0.0089
 (0.253)   (0.283)  
Ln(Age) -0.024  0.0005  -0.049  -0.0008
 (0.065)   (0.070)  
R&D_occ 0.945 ** 0.0113    
 (0.373)     
R&D_con 1.276 *** 0.0125  0.511 * 0.0758
 (0.340)   (0.269)  
Qualification 1.165 *** 0.0011  0.760 *** 0.0129
 (0.275)   (0.286)  
Patent_stock_dev 0.005 * 0.0000  -0.000  -0.0000
 (0.003)   (0.003)  
Group_national -0.439 ** -0.0038  -0.055  -0.0091
 (0.172)   (0.165)  
Group_foreign -0.652 ** -0.0046  -0.417  -0.0632
 (0.264)   (0.263)  
East 0.109  0.0010  0.495 *** 0.0860
 (0.194)   (0.166)  
Constant -8.193 ***  -4.285 *** 
 (0.452)   (0.445)  
No. of obs. 11,312   1,485  
Wald chi2 all 322.89 ***  141.88 *** 
Log-Likelihood    -698.760  
Mc Fadden's R2    0.142  
Note: *** (**,*) indicates significance level of 1% (5%, 10%); FD = First Difference. The first difference 
gives the discrete change in the expected value caused by increasing dummy variables from 0 to 1, DPF 
history from 0 to 1 (1 to 2) in first (second) regression, the mean of Sub_supply, Employees, Age, and 
Patent_stock_dev by 10 percent and the mean of Employees_change and Qualification by 10 percentage 
points, while holding the other explanatory variables at their means. Unless otherwise specified the 
variables refer to time t. Standard errors are clustered by firm because more than 50% of the firms appear 
more than once in the sample. 
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Subsidy-related variables 
The results show that prior experience with the funding schemes (DPF history), measured as 
the number of approved projects within the last five years, helps firms to enter the program 
again when compared to firms who did not participate in the program before. The positive 
impact of experience on getting a new DPF grant is also found for firms which receive 
subsidies at time t. The relationship between experience and the predicted probability of 
getting a new project funded for subsidized firms in t is depicted by the lower right graph in 
Figure 3 in the appendix. Setting all other variables to their mean, the graph clearly reflects 
the positive correlation between the number of prior grants and the predicted propensity to get 
a new project approved. The large impact of firm’s experience can also be seen by the high 
probability reached by this variable.18 
The ongoing support in t+1 for a previously approved project (Ongoing) has no effect on 
getting a new DPF grant. Thus the possibility that a firm drops out of the scheme does not 
increase the likelihood of getting a new project granted. This also indicates that subsidies are 
not necessarily approved after another project has ended. Instead firms may have several 
subsidized projects at the same time. 
Experience with other innovation programs has a significant effect on the probability of 
entering the program. The effect of having participated in an EU program (Sub_EU) is the 
same as the participation in regional programs (Sub_regional). However, for getting new 
subsidies approved once a firm is in the DPF scheme only successful applications to EU 
programs have a positive impact. Overall experience with the specific subsidy scheme greatly 
helps to place another successful application. Experience with other subsidy programs has a 
favourable effect in particular on entering the program. 
Besides the experience with subsidy programs it is of course imperative that subsidies are 
offered to the particular industry in which a firm operates at the ‘right’ time (Sub_supply). 
This is particularly relevant to the DPF scheme which offers thematically focused R&D 
funding within predefined areas of technology. If the supply is large in the industry in t+1, the 
probability of entering the program and receiving new subsidies increases. Thus, in order to 
explain the allocation of new DPF grants it is important to control for the overall supply of 
subsidies by sectors and years. 
Other variables 
The objective of the government to subsidize particularly SMEs in this scheme cannot be 
confirmed. The probability of receiving a new DPF grant increases with firms’ size for both 
non-subsidized and subsidized firms in t.19 The upper graphs in Figure 3 in the appendix 
                                                 
18 One might think that firms which conduct the subsidized projects in a co-operation with other firms or 
research institutions have a higher probability of getting new projects approved since the support of joint projects 
become more important. However by including a corresponding dummy variable in the regression, we see that 
this does not have a significant effect probably because 90% of all firms with subsidized projects in t are 
involved in joint projects. 
19 I also included the squared employee variable in the regression in order to control for a potential non-linear 
relationship. But the squared term was not significant in both regressions. 
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depict the predicted probability for the two transitions dependent on the number of 
employees, with all other variables set to their mean. The corresponding, predicted probability 
is fairly low in absolute terms and only reached 0.3 percent for firms with less than 1,000 
employees. But it is not negligible since the program entry constitutes a rare event. While the 
graph shows that the predicted probability of entering the scheme increases for all firm sizes 
in this range, the corresponding graph for the probability for already subsidized firms of 
getting a new project approved only has a relatively steep slope for smaller firms. The graph 
becomes more flat with more than 200 employees. Overall the positive correlation between 
firm size and the propensity of getting a new project approved can be seen. The source of this 
divergence from the government’s objective cannot be detected. Either SMEs do not apply 
more frequently for subsidies, the agency does not enforce this focus, or the focus is only set 
in very few programs within the DPF scheme so the effect does not show when all industries 
are taken into account. Bearing in mind that the sample covers the period 1994-2005 it is also 
possible that there was a shift towards SMEs over this period, however, that this was not 
revealed due to the pooling of cross-sections. Firms’ age (Age) does not matter since it does 
not have a significant effect on either transition probability. 
A firm’s employment growth in the past (Employees_change) does not have an effect on the 
probability of entering the scheme but positively influences the likelihood of getting further 
subsidies. The growth might be seen as an indicator of the successful conduct of previously 
subsidized projects. All of these latter firms have received subsidies from DPF before.  
As mentioned before, in order to enter the DPF scheme it is important that firms are engaged 
in R&D. It is not sufficient to have innovation activities – the sample is restricted to firms 
with positive innovation expenditures – but in addition firms should undertake their own 
R&D. The likelihood of entering the scheme increases if R&D activities are conducted. But it 
does not matter whether R&D is conducted continuously or occasionally since both effects 
are statistically equal. On average the probability increases by one percent if a firm conducts 
its own R&D. In those cases in which a firm receives subsidies from the DPF scheme in t, the 
firm conducts R&D at least occasionally. Discriminating between the two levels, it is shown 
that continuous R&D activities only slightly increase the likelihood of getting funding for a 
new project.20 Furthermore, human capital is relevant (Qualification). When a firm has a 
larger share of graduated employees the probability of entering the program increases either 
because, for example, they apply more often, have better elaborated applications or are chosen 
more often by the agencies. The effect on the probability is larger for firms with higher shares 
of qualified employees as is displayed in the lower left graph in Figure 3. These capabilities 
still affect the probability of getting new DPF grants if the firm already participates in the 
scheme. 
It is assumed that firms which already have a better technological performance – measured by 
firm’s patent stock compared to the industry average (Patent_stock_dev) – might be picked by 
the program agencies because they are promising candidates. It turns out that the patent stock 
                                                 
20 By including innovation intensity as an explanatory variable no significant effect on the probabilities was 
detected. 
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has a weakly positive effect on the probability of entering into the support scheme. No 
significant impact is found for firms who already participate in the scheme. I also ran a 
regression with the firms’ patent stock not related to the industries average but the results 
remained the same.21 Thus former success with R&D activities in terms of patent applications 
does not matter in this context. 
Overall, differentiating between the two measures which either indicate that the firm is 
already technologically further developed than others (Patent_stock_dev) or that the firm is on 
a promising and successful path because it grows (Employees_change), none of the variables 
have a strong impact on getting a new grant. It seems to be sufficient that a firm shows that it 
has the overall capabilities to finish the suggested project successfully.  
The affiliation to a domestic company group (Group_national) and whether the headquarters 
are located abroad (Group_foreign) negatively affect the allocation process if a firm enters the 
program. Once a firm is in the scheme the status of belonging to a company group has no 
further effect on getting new projects approved. For the probability of entering the funding 
scheme it does not matter where the firm is located (East), i.e. whether it is located in the 
Eastern or Western part of Germany. But if a firm from the Eastern part receives subsidies, it 
has a higher probability of getting further projects approved. This result is noteworthy since 
for East Germany a variety of other public support programs are available for firms in this 
area. 
The industry classified according to the technology scope in which a firm operates does not 
have a significant effect on the transition probabilities. Performing a Wald test, joint 
significance of the industry dummies could not be found in any regression and are thus 
dropped from the presented regressions. Industry effects may only relate to the supply-side 
effects of program volumes offered to a certain sector. The year dummies were also not 
significant in the regressions and therefore left out. The overall low additional explanation 
power of these two sets of dummy variables may be due to the inclusion of the overall 
subsidy supply variable which is generated on a more detailed industry level and a yearly 
basis.  
Sensitivity tests 
In order to test the sensitivity of the results, I split the sample according to a firm’s size or 
location and run the regressions for the sub-samples again (see Table 10 in the appendix). In 
order to conduct separate estimations depending on firm’s size, I differentiate between small, 
medium and large firms. Firms with 50 employees or less are considered as small firms. 
Medium-sized firms have between 51 and 500 employees. Firms with more than 500 
employees are deemed to be large firms. It becomes apparent that some factors differ with 
firm size regarding the entry into the subsidy scheme. In the group of small firms, young 
                                                 
21 In one regression I included the patent stock variable but excluded the variable Qualification since it might be 
suspected that a potential effect of the patent stock is captured by the qualification variable, though the 
correlation between these two variables is low (-0.02 (-0.08) in the sample of not subsidized (subsidized) firms in 
t). Excluding the variable Qualification from the regression does not change the results. 
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firms are more likely to enter the scheme. Participating experience in other subsidy programs 
particularly helps medium-sized firms to get into the funding scheme. Large firms do not need 
to exhibit their knowledge capabilities. Neither the R&D activities nor the share of qualified 
employees or previous patents have an effect. I also split the sample into two sub groups, 
according to whether firms in the sample are located in the Western or Eastern part of 
Germany. Noticeable differences are that experience in other funding schemes increases the 
probability of entering the scheme only for Western firms. Also the negative effect of the 
membership in a group is only significant for firms located in Western Germany.  
The analysis also shows that the results differ for the two transition probabilities, i.e. different 
variables have an effect on the receipt of a new subsidy, depending on whether the firm 
participated in the previous period. These differences indicate a different selection for the two 
groups, either on firms’ application side or authorities’ approving side, although there are no 
official rules to evaluate projects of already participating firms differently. 
7 Conclusions 
In this study the participation pattern of firms over time within the German R&D funding 
scheme, the DPF scheme, is analyzed. In order to investigate the persistence of funding it is 
necessary to distinguish between two types of persistence. One is simply due to the fact that 
funded projects may run for more than one calendar year. The other is due to newly approved 
projects. In the DPF scheme approved projects last on average for about three years. 
Therefore, I focus in particular on the allocation of new grants. 
Looking at all firms who participate in the DPF scheme some dynamic is detected since about 
40 percent of firms who get starting projects in a specific year participate for the first time. In 
a second step the DPF scheme is related to the population of firms by using a representative 
sample of German firms. Transition rates are calculated which describe the participation in a 
univariate context. The share of innovating firms who enter the funding scheme is extremely 
low. Over 98 percent of the firms who do not participate in the DPF scheme in a particular 
year do not receive DPF funding in the following year. Thus, the detected dynamic within the 
DPF scheme decreases if the new entrants are related to the population of potential entrants.  
Considering firms who receive subsidies, 24 percent of these firms get new DPF grants in the 
following year and almost 60 percent of the firms remain subsidized due to previously 
approved projects. Thus, the subsidization level is rather persistent in the examined support 
scheme. Several reasons might be responsible for this finding. On the side of applying firms, 
it might be due to the existence of asymmetric information. Not yet subsidized firms may 
have information deficiencies regarding possible sources of funding. Subsidized firms might 
also have realized learning effects due to previous applications or participation in the scheme, 
with the result that they are selected more often. On the other hand the finding could also be 
due to the program agencies’ selection rules and the result of a policy favoring a certain 
clientele. In this case the subsidy policy should be reconsidered. However, the continuous 
support of the same firms might also be simply the ‘natural’ result of a search by the 
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government to pick those projects which the firms would not have conducted without this 
grant. It cannot be distinguished whether the allocation pattern found is due to the application 
behavior of firms or because of the decision of the program agencies. I can only observe the 
net outcome: whether a firm is (newly) subsidized or not. It would definitely be a step 
forward if the corresponding data was available for this support scheme from the firm’s first 
contact with the program agency onwards. 
The multivariate analysis examines the factors which influence the receipt of new DPF grants 
conditional on whether the firms receive subsidies in the previous period. The results show 
that for the probability of getting new projects approved in the funding scheme, experience in 
the same scheme matters beyond the subsidy status in the preceding year. It is also shown that 
in an analysis of the allocation of new DPF grants it is important to control for the overall 
supply of corresponding subsidies. In addition, large firms are more successful in receiving 
funding for new projects. Thus the evidence cannot confirm that the scheme is achieving the 
government’s aim of supporting SMEs in particular. The hypotheses that firms with higher 
knowledge capabilities are more likely to get new DPF grants applies in particular for not 
previously subsidized firms as I found positive impacts of the variables measuring firm’s 
R&D capabilities. Thereby the achieved technological performance of a firm – measured by a 
firm’s patent stock compared to the industry average – has the least significant impact. For 
already subsidized firms, human capital matters primarily. Recent firm growth only slightly 
increases the probability of receiving further grants in the following year if a firm participates. 
Thus, the most promising and best equipped firms participate more frequently in the DPF 
scheme which indicates a picking-the-winner strategy on the part of the program agency. 
Firms located in East Germany have a higher probability of renewing their subsidy status via 
new grants once they make it into the scheme. The disproportionate participation of East 
German firms is noticeable since a variety of other public support programs exist solely for 
this area. 
The differences in the regressions results indicate a different selection for the two groups – 
new DPF entrants and new projects for DPF participants. As argued earlier, the source of the 
difference cannot be identified. Another shortcoming in the data used in this study is that no 
variables regarding the success of prior subsidized projects are known. This project-level 
information might have an impact on the decision to approve a further project. 
This analysis looks at which firms receive new DPF grants and how this public support 
evolves over time by considering a firm’s previous participation. It tries to assess whether the 
allocation corresponds to the government’s announcements of whom they aim to reach with 
the DPF scheme. Thereby the receipt of the DPF grant is a binary variable, either a firm 
receives public money or not. But it would also be worthwhile to consider the amount of 
money in order to weight the participation and assess its importance. The causality between 
the subsidy allocation and the effects it induces is beyond the scope of this paper. But in a 
further step the effects of public funding should be investigated so that the allocation can be 
evaluated. In doing so it would be important to distinguish between the different types of 
participants, i.e. whether a firm is new or frequently in the scheme. The program effects might 
change if a firm is continually publicly funded so that they count on the money. 
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Appendix 
 
  
Table 5: Overview of empirical studies 
Authors Country Data (sector; reference period; 
number of  observations) 
Estimation methoda Program Significant variablesb 
Feldman and Kelley 
(2001) 
USA Mainly manufacturingc; 1998; 
239 
logit Advanced Technology Program +existing linkages to other businesses, +openness regarding 
results, +new partnerships in project, +new technical area in 
project, +maximum score on reviewers’ rating of technical plan, 
+maximum score on reviewers’ rating of business plan & 
economic potentiald 
Duguet (2004) France Manufacturing and service; 
1985-1997; 16,776 
logite no specific program; national R&D 
subsidies from all ministries 
+past subsidy dummy, +past subsidy rate(ln), +size(ln sales), 
+private R&D/sales(ln), +debt/sales(ln)f 
González et al. (2005) Spain Manufacturing; 1990-1999; 
9,455 (2,214 firms) 
probit (in second step: tobit for 
subsidy amount) 
no specific program; regional, 
national, EU programs aggregated 
+subsidy dummy lagged one and two periods, −abnormal 
subsidy dummy, +size (emp) lagged, +age, +technological 
sophistication, +capital growth, +domestic exporter dummy 
lagged, +foreign capital dummy 
Tanayama (2007) Finland Manufacturing and knowledge 
intensive service; 2000-2002; 
12,275 
count data model (zero-inflated 
negative binomial) for no. of 
applications 
Finnish Funding Agency for 
Technology and Innovation (Tekes) 
binary and count process: +no. prior applications, -no. prior 
applications2, +size(ln emp), +no. board members; only binary: 
+export dummy; only count: -age, +age2, -sales/emp(ln), 
+sales/emp2, +parent company 
Busom (2000) Spain Manufacturing; 1988; 147  probit (used in Heckman’s two step 
model for R&D effort) 
no specific program; national or 
European programs separately 
−size(emp), +age, −patents obtained over last 10 years, −foreign 
ownershipg 
Wallsten (2000) USA Manufacturing and service; 
1990-1992; 481 
3-Stage Least Squares; 1st (2nd) 
stage: Number Phase 1(2) Awards 
SBIR, Phase 1 and Phase 2 awards +SBIR budget, +prior patent applications 
Czarnitzki and Fier 
(2002) 
Germany Service; 1994-1996 & 1996-
1998; 1,084 
probite no specific program; local, national, 
EU programs aggregated 
+size(ln emp), +location in Eastern Germany, +continuous 
R&D, +share of emp. with univ. degree in business 
admin./economics etc., −districts population density 
Almus and Czarnitzki 
(2003) 
Eastern 
Germany 
Manufacturing; 1992- 1994, 
1994-1996, 1996- 1998; 925 
probite no specific program; local, national, 
EU programs aggregated 
+size(ln emp), +patentstock/emp., −foreign parent comp., 
+export 
Aerts and Czarnitzki 
(2004) 
Belgium Manufacturing & service; 1998-
2000; 776 
probite no specific program; local, national, 
EU programs aggregated 
+size(ln emp), +patentstock/emp., −foreign parent comp., 
+export 
Blanes and Busom 
(2004) 
Spain Manufacturing; 1990- 1996; 
15,186 (463 different subsidized 
firms) 
multinomial logit (no R&D; R&D, 
no participation; R&D and 
participation), bivariate probit 
(national and regional program)h 
no specific program; regional and 
national programs aggregated 
+size(emp), +domestic; only nat.: +human capital; only reg.: 
−cash flowi 
Czarnitzki, Ebersberger 
and Fier (2004) 
Western 
Germany & 
Finland 
Manufacturing & service; 1994-
1996 & 1998-2000; DE: 1,464; 
FI: 1,520 
multinomial probit (subsidization, 
collaboration, both) e  
no specific program; local, national, 
EU programs aggregated 
+size(ln emp), +share of R&D emp., +lagged patent application; 
only FI: +export 
Czarnitzki and Licht 
(2006) 
Germany Manufacturing; 1992- 1994 & 
1994-1996 & 1996-1998 & 
1998-2000; 6,462 (3,409 R&D 
performing firms) 
probite no specific program; local, national, 
EU programs aggregated 
-no patent stock lagged, -foreign parent company, +export 
dummy; only Eastern: +size(ln emp), -size2, -age(ln), +R&D 
department, -Western German group association; only Western: 
+patent stock lagged, +credit rating (ln) 
Notes: a If not otherwise mentioned, the dependent variable is a dummy indicating participation in the subsidy program. b Significant at least on the 5%-level; + and − indicates positive and negative effects, respectively. 
emp = employees. Significant industry and time dummies are not listed. c Sectors are not explicitly mentioned. d Variables for first-time application to ATP and number of previous ATP awards are included but are not 
significant. e First step estimation within matching approach. f Separate estimations for each year (12 estimations). Variable is listed when it is significantly in the same direction for at least in ten out of the twelve years. g 
Results are for national programs since results for European programs must “be interpreted with caution” (Busom, 2000, p. 127). h Separate estimations for six industry groups and national and regional programs; results 
from the multinomial logit, variable is indicated as significant when it is significantly in the same direction for at least in three out of the six industries. i By applying a bivariate probit model the effect of this variable is 
different. 
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Table 6: Overview of industries 
Industry sector  Service sector 
Branches of industry  NACE   Branches of industry  NACE 
Manufacturing    Knowledge intensive services  
Textile.  17-19  Computer/telecomm. 72, 64.2 
Wood/paper/printing  20-22  Technical services 73, 74.2-74.3 
Chemicals  23-24  Consultancies 74.1, 74.4 
Plastic/rubber  25    
Glass/ceramics 26    
Metals 27-28    
Machinery 29    
Electrical engineering 30-32    
Medical, precision, and optical 33    
Vehicles 34-35    
Furniture/recycling 36-37    
 
 
 
Table 7: Firms’ observation pattern in the sample 
Whole sample  Innovating firmsa No. of 
observations No. of firms  Percent No. of obs.  No. of firms Percent No. of obs.
1 2,939 42.8 2,939  2,450 46.9 2,450
2 1,265 18.4 2,530  1,038 19.9 2,076
3 856 12.5 2,568  636 12.2 1,908
4 524 7.6 2,096  385 7.4 1,540
5 326 4.8 1,630  210 4.0 1,050
6 274 4.0 1,644  177 3.4 1,062
7 226 3.3 15,82  127 2.4 889
8 155 2.3 1,240  78 1.5 624
9 111 1.6 999  55 1.1 495
10 85 1.2 850  26 0.5 260
11 61 0.9 671  25 0.5 275
12 43 0.6 516  14 0.3 168
Total 6,865 100.00 19,265  5,221 100.00 12,797
Note: a Innovating firms are firms with positive innovation expenditures in t. 
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Table 8: Transition rates for not subsidized firms in t, based on the sample 
  Status in t+1 
Year  No. of obs. Not subs. Subs. Total
1994  307 97.39 2.61 100.0
1995  500 97.80 2.20 100.0
1996  1,142 97.64 2.36 100.0
1997  666 99.40 0.60 100.0
1998  1,332 98.87 1.13 100.0
1999  765 97.65 2.35 100.0
2000  1,147 97.91 2.09 100.0
2001  647 97.53 2.47 100.0
2002  1,054 98.58 1.42 100.0
2003  724 98.48 1.52 100.0
2004  1,647 98.06 1.94 100.0
2005  1,381 98.77 1.23 100.0
Total  11,312 98.25 1.75 100.0
 
 
 
Table 9: Transition rates for subsidized firms in t, based on the population and on the 
sample 
  Status in t+1 
  Population  Sample 
Year  No. of obs. Not subs. Subs. Total  No. of obs. Not subs. Subs. Total
1994  1,697 14.79 85.21 100.0  27 14.81 85.19 100.0
1995  1,875 27.04 72.96 100.0  35 31.43 68.57 100.0
1996  1,816 16.85 83.15 100.0  91 4.40 95.60 100.0
1997  2,011 16.16 83.84 100.0  66 13.64 86.36 100.0
1998  2,040 17.84 82.16 100.0  97 17.53 82.47 100.0
1999  2,235 20.76 79.24 100.0  62 20.97 79.03 100.0
2000  2,402 22.69 77.31 100.0  176 20.45 79.55 100.0
2001  2,756 9.98 90.02 100.0  83 6.02 93.98 100.0
2002  3,208 16.02 83.98 100.0  299 12.71 87.29 100.0
2003  3,101 25.51 74.49 100.0  172 20.93 79.07 100.0
2004  2,761 24.92 75.08 100.0  213 26.76 73.24 100.0
2005  2,730 18.50 81.50 100.0  164 16.46 83.54 100.0
Total  25,727 19.26 80.75 100.0  1,485 17.31 82.69 100.0
Notes: a The population is calculated from the PROFI database. Only firms which are subsidized in t are 
considered. Contract research is not included. 
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Figure 3: Predicted probability of transition 
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Solid line: predicted probability of transition depending on the specific variable, all other variables set to 
their mean. 
Dotted lines: simulated 90% confidence interval for the predicted probability of transition, using 10,000 
simulations. 
Source: own calculations. 
 
  
Table 10: Regression results for sub-samples (coefficients are shown) 
 Not subsidized ? subsidized Subsidized ? newly subsidized 
 Rare events logit model Logit model 
 Firm size Firm location Firm size Firm location 
Variable Small  Medium  Large   West  East  Small  Medium  Large   West  East  
DPF history t-4? t 1.476 *** 1.391 *** 0.935 ***  1.192 *** 1.295 *** 0.252 ** 0.448 *** 0.260 ***  0.368 *** 0.319 *** 
Ongoing t+1        0.359  -0.035  0.364   0.012  0.512  
Sub_EU t-2? t 0.548  0.564 * 0.495   0.542  0.449  0.533 ** 0.019  0.498   0.343  0.429 * 
Sub_regional t-2? t 0.552  0.887 *** 0.046   0.960 *** 0.173  0.196  0.063  0.360   0.240  0.064  
Sub_supply t+1 0.101 *** 0.032  0.093 ***  0.080 *** 0.025  0.036  0.011  0.117 **  0.056 ** 0.006  
Ln(Employees) 0.425  0.778 *** 0.293   0.578 *** 0.408 *** 0.345  0.416 ** 0.642 ***  0.248 *** 0.185 ** 
Employees_change 0.590 * 0.431  0.055   0.341  0.589 * 0.431  0.619  1.333   0.214  1.191 * 
Ln(Age)  -0.375 * 0.025  0.008   0.023  -0.190  -0.028  -0.025  0.060   -0.083  0.004  
R&D_occ 1.118 * 0.692  0.388   0.613 * 1.088 *         
R&D_con 1.106 * 0.774 * 1.332   1.081 ** 1.245 ** 0.897 * 0.530  -0.418   0.476  0.422  
Qualification 1.342 *** 1.751 *** -0.002   1.419 *** 0.965 ** 0.487  1.035 ** 1.286   1.130 *** 0.501  
Patent_stock_dev 0.244  0.020  0.005   0.005 * 0.043  0.046  -0.008  -0.002   -0.000  -0.009  
Group_national -0.439  -0.343  -0.293   -0.497 ** -0.128  0.175  -0.089  -0.358   -0.112  0.206  
Group_foreign  -0.743 * -0.428   -0.693 ** -0.225    -0.324  0.585   -0.654 * 0.064  
East -0.145  0.265  0.028     0.375  0.541 ** 0.610      
Constant -7.181 *** -9.366 *** -6.751 ***  -8.256 *** -6.884 *** -4.939 *** -5.186 *** -8.692 ***  -4.235 *** -5.499 *** 
No. of obs. 4,975  5,105  1,232   7,511  3,801  487  600  398   978  507  
Transition rate 0.76  1.86  5.28   1.76  1.74  20.33  24.00  27.64   20.96  29.19  
Wald chi2_all 102.47 *** 140.39 *** 57.28 ***  235.91 *** 103.89 *** 51.01 *** 81.38 *** 126.64 ***  120.58 *** 110.78 *** 
Wald chi2_year     18.29 *  19.92 **     28.43 ***  25.01 *** 17.24 * 
Wald chi2_industry           15.08 ***     
Mc Fadden's R2        0.115  0.166  0.243   0.168  0.149  
Notes: a Small firms have 50 employees or less, medium-sized firms between 51 and 500 employees and large firms more than 500 employees. *** (**,*) indicates 
significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). In the regressions for small firms the foreign variable is excluded since no small firm which is foreign-owned gets a newly subsidized 
project. Unless otherwise specified, the variables refer to time t. Standard errors are clustered because almost 50% of the firms participate more than once. Year and industry 
dummies are included in the regressions if they are jointly significant. 
 
